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hardly be determined without a more thorough investigation of
facts. An air landing into an enemy airhead will always result in
confusion on both sides. It will, of necessity, lead to chaotic hand-
to-hand fighting, similar to the cavalry battles fought centuries ago,
in which ultimately the tougher and more tenacious fighter will be
victorious. The initial advantage is definitely gained by the opponent
who is aware of the situation and jumps into the enemy airhead
deliberately. If, in addition, he is supported from the outside by a
concentrated thrust on the ground, it is quite likely that he will
succeed in achieving a complete victory. The only question is
whether, in the case of a large-scale airborne operation which
definitely presupposes the air superiority of the attacker, the
defender will be in any position to carry out an air landing. At night
this might be conceivable. In any event, such a counter-jump
likewise requires preparations and is therefore possible only if the
attacker lands in an area where the defender has taken such
preparatory measures.
Section VII. AN APPRAISAL OF ALLIED AIR LANDINGS
During a war, the success of one side and the failure of the other
are interrelated. In general, the success of the defender's measures
can best be judged by the degree to which the attacker, as the
active party, has been able to realize his goal. From this point of
view the three major Allied airborne operations during 1944-45 will
be briefly evaluated.
The Allied air landings in Normandy in June 1944 were carried out in
close tactical collaboration with the amphibious operations. The
Germans expected the air landings to take place farther inland, and
to be aimed at more strategic objectives. Defensive measures were
taken accordingly. The choice of landing areas for the over-all
operations came as a surprise and, consequently, the defensive
front was such that in comparison with other areas it was
inadequately fortified and was held by weak German forces. The
majority of the German reserve was committed elsewhere and was
only reluctantly released for action.
Passive defence measures taken by the Germans did not influence
the progress of the Allied airborne operations to any large extent.
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The first air landing, owing to an error in orientation, was dispersed
far beyond the originally planned area. This caused the dissipation
of initial German countermeasures. Isolated German successes were
not able to prevent the over-all success of the air landing. Besides,
since the drop zones covered a large area, it was difficult for the
German command to quickly gain an accurate picture of the
situation. This resulted in the erroneous commitment of the
reserves and also had an adverse effect on the morale of the
German troops. Because of the unmistakable air superiority of the
enemy, it was impossible for the German countermeasures to be
executed rapidly enough. The German counterattacks were able to
narrow the landing areas temporarily and to limited extent; they
succeeded in preventing the troops which had landed from
immediately taking the offensive. They also succeeded in
temporarily placing the Allied airborne troops in critical situations.
The German reserves were almost completely tied down by the air
landings, making it impossible to launch effective counterattacks
against the amphibious assault. Consequently, the attackers were
able to gain a foothold on the coast and, within a short time, to
establish contact with the airborne elements. The tactical objective
of establishing a bridgehead as thus accomplished despite German
countermeasures.
The significant fact is that the air landings made it possible to
substantially increase the number of forces which had been brought
to the mainland during the first phase, thus augmenting the purely
numerical superiority of the attacker over the defender.
It is open to question whether air landings with distinct
concentration of forces on tactical objectives would have caused a
more rapid collapse of the German over-all defence. Of course, the
landings on the beaches would then have been more difficult. It also
might have been possible to unify the German countermeasures
against the invasion more effectively. The chances for greater
victory would have involved a greater risk.
The air landings at Eindhoven, Nijmegen, and Arnhem in September
1944 were directed at breaking up the German front and paving the
way for the British troops to reach the northern flank of the Ruhr
area via the Meuse, the Waal, and the lower Rhine Rivers. The plan
of attack offered the best chances of a major strategic victory. The
operations also differed greatly from the Normandy landing in that
they occurred during mobile warfare. Consequently, the Germans
were unable to take defensive measures to the extent possible
under conditions of position warfare. On the basis of intelligence
reports, the Germans had anticipated enemy airborne operations.
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Furthermore, the commanders in the near-by home defense zones
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